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Abstract
Coasean arguments against the Pigouvian perspective are well established. A central
tenet in this criticism argues that a Pigouvian tax may be a source of inefficiency: if par-
ties were to bargain in the presence of a Pigouvian tax, (allocative) inefficiencies would
occur—the so-called Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem. By analyzing a Coasean en-
vironment where the appropriation of property rights is costly, we show Coasean bargain-
ing in the presence of a pre-existing (Pigouvian) tax may be superior. This has implications
for policy where dual regulatory environments exist, such as regulation at the state and
federal level, as well as environmental liability and litigation.
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1 Introduction
As is well known, the seminal work by Coase (1959, 1960) provides a rigorous rebuttal of
the Pigouvian perspective. In particular, Coase (1960) argued that the Pigouvian prescription
to externalities was entirely misguided as this perspective failed to take into account the
reciprocal nature of harm. Further, Coase (1960) showed that if parties could costlessly bargain
(and property rights were well defined), an efficient level of harm would be reached without
the requirement of direct government action. As a result, the ‘Coase Theorem’ argued that
efficiency is independent of the initial endowment of liability.
A central theme within the Coasean perspective is that Pigouvian taxation, instead of al-
leviating the problem of harm, actually creates additional distortions. This argument was
first constructed within Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) and interpreted and modified by
Turvey (1963), whereby in a Coasean environment—where agents have the ability to cost-
lessly bargain—the presence of a Pigouvian tax provides additional incentives to reduce harm,
which leads to an allocatively inefficient equilibrium. In particular, Buchanan and Stubblebine
(1962, p. 383) argue “that full Pareto equilibrium can never be attained via the imposition of
unilaterally imposed taxes and subsidies until all marginal externalities are eliminated.” Tur-
vey (1963, p. 310) also develops this idea by arguing that “[w]hether A and B are persons
or firms, to levy a tax on A which is not received as damages or compensation by B may
prevent optimal resource allocation from being achieved.” We refer to this as the Buchanan-
Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem.1 This theorem can be easily illustrated in a figure. Consider a
Coasean environment where players bargain over the level of harm, h. Figure 1 represents the
marginal damages of a player D′(h) as well as the marginal benefits of another player B′N(h)
where superscript N denotes a ‘no-tax’ case. In the traditional Coasean argumentation, h∗N
is the efficient equilibrium level of harm. What the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem
argues is that under the presence of a Pigouvian tax, marginal benefits adjust to B′(h) and—
due to the ability to bargain—an alternative equilibrium level of harm is determined at h∗.
Thus Coasean bargaining in the presence of a pre-existing Pigouvian tax generates allocative
inefficiencies.
This theorem is a conventional—and seemingly uncontroversial—Coasean perspective on
the inefficiencies of Pigouvian taxation; accordingly, this has been frequently discussed in en-
1We borrow this term from Mohring and Boyd (1971). Further, it is also stated in Turvey (1963) that the use of
a tax can only be Pareto superior if there exists a double tax-subsidy scheme where the non-taxed player obtains
full compensation.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem.
vironmental economics textbooks and literature surveys (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1988; Crop-
per and Oates, 1992).2 The implications of this result are significant. If players are likely to
bargain then a tax should not be levied on the level of harm. This may be relevant to cases
where, for example, a federal government levies a tax but players bargain over the level of
harm at the state (local) level (e.g., local negotiation over property rights for air pollution,
resource extraction, and so on).3 Although the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem is in-
tuitive, it is unclear whether this theorem holds for an environment where attribution and
enforcement of property rights is costly.
In this article we evaluate the overall efficiency of Coasean bargaining in the presence of
Pigouvian taxation. We analyze a two-stage Coasean environment, where—in the first stage—
the initial endowment of property rights is costly to appropriate. In the second stage players
bargain over the level of harm. Allowing property rights to be initially costly to appropri-
ate diverges from the standard Coasean paradigm, but it is intuitive when one considers the
process of acquiring property rights is far from costless: in reality activities such as violent
conflict, litigation, and lobbying, are frequently observed. Such efforts represent ex ante trans-
action costs, which are both endogenously determined by players and a pre-condition for
Coasean bargaining. Our results show that, in a costly Coasean environment, a pre-existing
2For a recent discussion on Coasean and Pigouvian perspectives see Anderson and Parker (2013) and Banzhaf
et al. (2013). For a general analysis of the ‘Coase Theorem’ see Schweizer (1988) and for an application to environ-
mental economics see Medema (2014).
3A common misconception is that this argument may be directly transplanted into the debate on hybrid market-
based environmental regulation, where a cap-and-trade market is combined with a price mechanism (e.g., price
ceiling). Thus hybrid mechanisms should be undesirable. Such a prima facie conclusion is unwarranted. As
outlined by Medema (2014), there is little in common with the existence of a cap-and-trade market and the bilateral
bargaining procedure discussed in Coase (1960).
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(Pigouvian) tax may be Kaldor-Hicks and even Pareto superior. The intuition is as follows.
As property rights are now costly to appropriate, the presence of a (Pigouvian) tax reduces
the value of Coasean bargaining and reduces the equilibrium effort used to appropriate prop-
erty rights. What we show is that the reduction in appropriation efforts may outweigh any
reduction in efficiency due to distorted equilibrium harm levels. That is, the use of Pigouvian
taxation assists in reducing endogenous ex ante transaction costs and can lead to improve-
ments in efficiency. Hence, once it is recognized that the Coasean solution is not costless the
case for a Pigouvian tax is strengthened considerably.
To model the initial appropriation of property rights we use contest theory, where players
invest in sunk effort to obtain property rights (e.g., Congleton et al., 2008).4 In particular, we
use a common appropriation mechanism—an all-pay auction—to represent the institutions
governing the appropriation of property rights. We can consider cases where property rights
are non-existent (such as common-pool resources) or where property rights need to be en-
forced. Thus the use of appropriation activities can be interpreted as a process where initially
non-contractible levels of harmful activities can be explicitly defined (via a court, lobbying,
violent force, and so on), which allows contracting and thus Coasean bargaining to commence.
Generally, advocates of the Pigouvian perspective have dealt with the Buchanan-Stubblebine-
Turvey Theorem by simply conceding the argument that “where small numbers are involved,
the imposition of a ‘corrective’ Pigouvian tax may be too much of a good thing—it can produce
a misallocation rather than eliminating it” (Baumol, 1972, p 308). Thus, only when the num-
bers involved are sufficiently large, Pigouvians argue that the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey
Theorem is irrelevant—this argument is similar to the conventional criticism of Coasean bar-
gaining being unworkable for large numbers (Aivazian and Callen, 1981).5 Relaxing the as-
sumption on how property rights are appropriated in society—by introducing endogenous ex
ante transaction costs—we are able to provide an argument that may favor a dual regulatory
prescription. We can thus show that if property rights are costly to appropriate the presence of
a pre-existing (Pigouvian) tax in a Coasean environment may be beneficial to all. Although the
4Glazer and Konrad (1999) have investigated levying taxes within contest structures. In particular, they focus
on taxes levied on contest efforts as well as taxes on profits obtained from participating in the contest (net of
contest efforts). For taxes on profit, they show that the tax structure is an important factor in determining how
equilibrium contest efforts change. As we follow the Pigouvian tradition, our focus here is on levying a tax based
on the marginal damage of harm at equilibrium (or some sub-optimal variant). In order to fully replicate the
Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem, our taxation system is intentionally separated from the contest institution
and, instead, levied on the player prior to participation in the contest.
5Also see Parisi (2003) and Robson (2012) for further discussions about Coasean bargaining in the large numbers
case.
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level of equilibrium harm is similar to that discussed in Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) and
Turvey (1963), we show that overall efficiency may increase with the establishment of a Pigou-
vian tax. Therefore we are able to defend Pigouvian taxation from the Coasean perspective
and thus provide a stronger case for using the Pigouvian remedy as a policy instrument.
Due to the relative orthodoxy and prima facie intuition associated with the Buchanan-
Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem, few have attempted to extend or even contradict this argument.
Recently, however, Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) have attempted to investigate under what
circumstances Coasean bargaining can justify Pigouvian taxation. They find the use of Pigou-
vian taxation can help alleviate the hold-up problem in bargaining. In contrast, we focus on
cases where the property rights can be de jure non-existent (e.g., common-pool resources), or
where property rights are insecure (i.e., costly to enforce and/or ambiguously defined), where
conflict, lobbying, and litigation can be used to obtain property rights. Costly appropriation
is thus a method that resolves the non-contractiblity of harm and allows exchange. Robson
and Skaperdas (2008) model costly property right appropriation and find that, in some cases,
going to court Pareto dominates bargaining whereas MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2013a,b) in-
vestigate the Pareto improvements that occur due to the a priori capping of transfers on tort
law damages and the implementation of bargaining restrictions, respectively. This article is
similar to Robson and Skaperdas (2008) and MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2013a,b) in that costly
appropriation is taken into account when there exists the potential for Coasean bargaining,
however, these works do not consider the efficiency of Coasean bargaining in the presence of
Pigouvian taxation—the main objective of this article. Thus by combining the theory of prop-
erty right appropriation with the literature on Coasean bargaining we provide a new insight
on the traditional argumentation presented in Coasean and Pigouvian perspectives.
Our article contributes to the wider debate on transaction costs within Coasean bargain-
ing. Under the conventional “normative Coase theorem” interpretation, lawmakers should
“[s]tructure the law so as to remove the impediments to private agreements” (Cooter and
Ulen, 1997, p. 89). That is, legal systems should be designed in order to improve the potential
gains from trade, which will allow (additional) bargaining. Yet, as our analysis shows, this
perspective is called into question when the initial appropriation of property rights is costly:
a change in the legal system that improves bargaining gains may also generate large appro-
priation costs, which reduces aggregate welfare. If the initial appropriation of property rights
is costly then the existence of a (Pigouvian) tax may be efficiency enhancing. Consequently,
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in such a Coasean environment, a lawmaker should consider taxation rather than reducing
impediments to private agreements.
This article is structured as follows. In Section 2 the framework of Coasean bargaining
with Pigouvian taxation is described. In Section 3 the results are explained. In Section 4 we
provide some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a situation in which player X causes harm to player Y.6 The harm-producing activity
generates a private benefit to player X, which we denote as BN(h) where h > 0 is the level
of harm and the notation “N” denotes the ‘no-tax’ benchmark. Let h¯N be defined such that
B′(h¯N) = 0, that is, h¯N is the level of harmful activity that player X would choose in absence of
any regulation or institutional influences. For all h ∈ [0, h¯N] we assume B′N(h) > 0, B′′N(h) ≤
0, BN(0) = 0, and define BN(h¯N) = B¯N . For all h ∈
[
0, h¯N
]
, player Y experiences harm denoted
by D(h) with D(0) = 0, D′(h) > 0, D′′(h) ≥ 0, and D(h¯N) = D¯N .
Following Coase (1960), we allow the creation of property rights over the level of harm,
which is divisible over [0, h¯N ]. In contrast to the standard Coasean paradigm, however, we
do not assume that the property rights are provided in an ad hoc manner. Instead, we allow
the initial endowment of property rights to be determined by players’ costly efforts, which
we denote as x, y ∈ R+, for players X and Y, respectively. This could, for example, represent
litigation, conflict, or rent seeking. As such, these efforts can be interpreted as ex ante trans-
action costs, the level of which is endogenously determined by the players’ choices in effort.
Thus, by expending effort, player j ∈ {X, Y} has a probability pj(x, y) of winning the property
rights. Throughout this article we will assume that the initial endowment of property rights
is given by the following assumption.7
6We follow the standard Coasean paradigm and focus on the two-player case. Our framework can be extended
to allow for n players. In such a setting two groups can be formed where the allocation of property rights is
determined by aggregate group efforts and then group Coasean bargaining occurs. After, individuals either have
intra-group bargaining over the rents or, as commonly modeled in the literature, an intra-group sharing rule exists
(Congleton et al., 2008).
7See the appendix for an alternative formulation.
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Assumption 1. Player X’s probability of obtaining the property rights is given by pX(x, y) where
pX(x, y) =

1 if x > y
1
2 if x = y
0 if x < y
(1)
and pY(x, y) = 1− pX(x, y) for all x, y ∈ [0,∞).
The process of initial property endowment is thus determined via an all-pay auction,
where the agent with the largest level of effort has a probability of one of obtaining the
property rights. In absence of Coasean bargaining, if the property rights are awarded to
player X, then they will receive a benefit of B¯N whereas player Y will suffer harm relating to
D¯. Alternatively if player Y obtains the property rights then it will initially experience zero
harm and player X will therefore also experience zero benefit.8 As argued in Coase (1960),
the initial endowment of property rights creates an opportunity for players to benefit from
exchange over the level of harm.9 Let us denote h∗N = arg maxh∈[0,h¯N ]
{
BN(h)− D(h)} as the
efficient Coasean bargaining solution. We follow Coase (1960) and assume property rights
are attributed to one player. In the appendix, however, we provide an alternative framework
where players may receive a share of property rights.
Let τ be a per-unit tax levied on player X’s harmful activity such that B(h) ≡ BN(h)− τ · h,
where BN(h) is player X’s benefit under a ‘no-tax’ situation for a level of harmful activity
h ∈ [0, h¯N]. As standard, the tax distorts player X’s benefit function to internalize the harm
generated.10 As a consequence, the domain of the benefit function reduces to the interval
[0, h¯] ⊆ [0, h¯N ], where h¯ is implicitly defined by B′(h¯) = 0. Although we will consider a
general form of taxation, note that a Pigouvian tax is the special case where τ = D′(h∗N),
and hence h¯ = h∗N . When considering the case of a tax, we will assume that the tax has been
implemented prior to the commencement of Coasean bargaining (and any costs of establishing
this tax are sunk). We, therefore, have the Coasean bargaining solution under the presence of
a tax, h∗ = arg maxh∈[0,h¯] {B(h)− D(h)}. Hence, for Coasean bargaining to occur B(h) > D(h)
8Alternatively, this structure could be framed in the converse of harm, i.e., harm avoidance. In such as case,
Coasean bargaining occurs over player X’s abatement cost and player Y’s damages.
9The non-contractability of property rights prior to bargaining is a result of the property rights being de jure non-
existent or insecure (ambiguously defined or costly to enforce). Thus the contest—through use of appropriation
efforts—provides a process by which enforceable property rights are established, which provides the basis for
bargaining.
10We initially assume that the revenue generated from the tax is not used in any form. We relax this assumption
later in the article.
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for h ∈ [0, h¯] has to hold, which we assume throughout. Note that given our assumptions
on players’ benefit (damage) functions it follows that h¯ ≤ h¯N and h∗ ≤ h∗N . Thus, in the
presence of taxation the equilibrium harm level will be lower than that experienced in the
Coasean bargaining game without a tax. In other words, there is an inefficiently high level of
precaution from player X due to the presence of the tax: the so-called Buchanan-Stubblebine-
Turvey Theorem (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962; Turvey, 1963). Let us begin in a Coasean
environment where there is a pre-existing (Pigouvian) tax.
2.2 Coasean bargaining in the presence of (Pigouvian) taxation
In our analysis, the all-pay auction will provide an initial endowment of property rights to a
player at one of the domain extremes {0, h¯}.11 Specifically, if player X obtains the property
rights the initial starting point for bargaining is h = h¯. Alternatively, player Y may obtain
the property rights and therefore h = 0. With property rights being distributed to either
player, gains from exchange are feasible as a positive internalization rent can be shared via a
bargaining process. Thus let the rent under a tax be denoted by Ij for j ∈ {X, Y}, which is
defined as:
IX ≡ D¯− ((B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗)) if agent X wins the property rights, (2)
IY ≡ B¯− ((B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗)) if agent Y wins the property rights, (3)
where D¯ ≡ D(h¯) and B¯ ≡ B(h¯). From (2) and (3), the total internalization rent that can be
obtained by the winner of the contest is their opponent’s total possible loss minus the costs
(reductions in benefits) that are payable as compensation to the party holding the property
right in order to achieve the post-bargaining equilibrium. It is indeed within the Coasean
logic that the total equilibrium cost ((B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗)), i.e., own cost plus compensation,
must always be borne by the party not holding the property right in order to reach the bar-
gaining outcome h∗. Given Ij is the maximum internalization rent possible, we allow players’
bargaining powers to influence the distribution of the internalization rent. In particular, the
11This follows the conventional Coasean paradigm. It is easy to extend this to allow for initial bargaining
positions other than the extremities. This can be done by allowing for a parameter φ > 0 where the domain
extremes are given by {0+ φ, h¯− φ} such that the initial benefits and damages are given by B(h¯− φ) and D(0+ φ).
Our results continue to hold if the proportional reduction in rent shares are the same across the tax and non-tax
cases. For analysis on restrictions to the externality domain see MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2013b).
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rents acquired by the winning players X and Y are given by
RX ≡ µX · IX ≥ 0, (4)
RY ≡ µY · IY ≥ 0, (5)
respectively, where µj ∈ [0, 1] is a share parameter determined by the bargaining power of the
winning player j.12 This representation of the bargaining powers is general enough to allow
for any bargaining game, such as the Nash bargaining solution or the alternating-offers game.
Also note that we make no assumption on the relationship between µX and µY, thus if player
X is able to secure a larger share of rent when winning, this does not preclude player Y doing
the same when winning the contest.
Players’ expected payoffs are therefore:
UX(x, y) = pX(x, y) · (RX + B¯)− (1− pX(x, y)) · (D(h∗) + RY − B(h∗))− x, (6)
UY(x, y) = pY(x, y) · (RY)− (1− pY(x, y)) · ((B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗) + RX)− y. (7)
If player X wins the contest without bargaining, they receive B¯. Bargaining will only occur
if player X receives at least the same level of pay-off. In addition to B¯, after bargaining, X
will receive his share of the internalization rent, i.e., RX. If, on the other hand, player X loses,
they will pay damage compensation and rent to player Y, D(h∗) + RY, and receive a benefit of
B(h∗). If player Y wins they receive RY but if they lose they pay RX as well as compensation
to player X, (B¯ − B(h∗)), as well as experiencing damage of D(h∗). Following the Coasean
logic, even if a player loses, they still have an incentive to bargain as the losses will always be
greater without bargaining.
In the first-price all-pay auction with complete information, the party with the largest
appropriation effort secures the property rights with certainty. We allow both players to play
mixed strategies. The expected payoff functions in (6) and (7) can hence be written in the
general form pj(x, y)Wj − (1− pj(x, y))Lj , with j ∈ {X, Y} where Wj and Lj are the respective
12Correspondingly, the loser will receive an internalization rent: (1− µX) · IX for (losing) player Y and (1− µY) ·
IY for (losing) player X.
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awards and losses. Collecting pj(x, y) and defining vj = Wj + Lj, this can be re-arranged to:
pX(x, y)vX − LX − x, (8)
pY(x, y)vY − LY − y. (9)
In this format, it is well known (e.g., Hillman and Riley, 1989) that if vX ≥ vY, then the
equilibrium is indeed in mixed strategies. In equilibrium, the agents’ optimal cumulative bid
distribution function are given by
GX =

x
vY
for x ∈ [0, vY]
1 for x > vY
(10)
and
GY =

[
1− vYvX
]
+ yvX for y ∈ [0, vY]
1 for y > vY.
(11)
For these strategies, the expected payoffs of both players are therefore:
UX =− LX + GYvX − x = −LX + vX − vY, (12)
UY =− LY + GXvY − y = −LY. (13)
Noting from (6) and (7) that
vX = vY = (B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗) + RX + RY. (14)
It follows that both players have an identical valuation of the property rights, and the expected
payoffs of players X and Y are UX = −LX and UY = −LY, which can be rewritten as:
UX =− (D(h∗) + RY − B(h∗)), (15)
UY =− ((B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗) + RX). (16)
2.3 Benchmark: the elimination of taxes
Let us now consider a Coasean environment where there does not exist a (Pigouvian) tax.
In such a case bargaining yields allocative efficiency, which also implies that the respective
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internalization rents are larger. Setting τ = 0 the expected payoffs of players X and Y are
given by:
UNX (x, y) = pX(x, y) · (RNX + B¯N)− (1− pX(x, y)) · (D(h∗N) + RNY − BN(h∗N))− x, (17)
UNY (x, y) = pY(x, y) · RNY − (1− pY(x, y)) · ((B¯N − BN(h∗N)) + D(h∗N) + RNX )− y. (18)
Again, we assume that property rights are allocated via an all-pay auction which takes place
prior to the Coasean bargaining process. Note that for the standard Coasean environment,
players’ net gains vj are also identical, as
vNX = v
N
Y = (B¯
N − BN(h∗N)) + D(h∗N) + RNX + RNY . (19)
Hence, we can solve the game, with simple Coasean bargaining, analogously to the tax case.
The expected payoffs of players X and Y in equilibrium are then given by:
UNX =− (D(h∗N) + RNY − BN(h∗N)), (20)
UNY =− ((B¯N − B(h∗N)) + D(h∗N) + RNX ). (21)
3 Results
We are now ready to compare the expected payoffs of players with and without a (Pigouvian)
tax. For player X, comparison of (15) with (20) and simplification reveals
UX −UNX = −(1− µY)(INY − IY). (22)
The sign of this term is (weakly) negative. For player Y, comparing (16) with (21), and noting
our initial assumptions on the benefit and cost curves, we find that player Y has a higher
expected payoff in the presence of a tax:
UY −UNY = µX(INX − IX)− (INY − IY) + (B¯N − B¯) > 0. (23)
Summing up over (22) and (23), yields the difference in aggregated welfare ∆:
∆ = µX(INX − IX)− (2− µY)(INY − IY) + (B¯N − B¯). (24)
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From (24) note that the first and last terms are positive, whereas the second term is negative.
To provide further insight, we can decompose ∆ into distinct elements that focus on ap-
propriation costs and welfare. To consider how equilibrium appropriation costs change, note
that aggregate appropriation costs under a tax are given by:
E[x + y] = vX = vY = (B¯− B(h∗)) + D(h∗) + RX + RY. (25)
Similarly, for the case without a tax, the aggregate appropriation costs are given by
E[xN + yN ] = vNX = v
N
Y = (B¯
N − BN(h∗N)) + D(h∗N) + RNX + RNY . (26)
Subtracting (25) from (26) and simplifying shows that:
E[xN + yN − (x + y)] = µX(INX − IX)− (1− µY)(INY − IY) + (B¯N − B¯) > 0. (27)
Hence, appropriation costs are unambiguously lower under a tax regime compared to a ‘no-
tax’ regime. Subtraction of (27) from (24) reveals a residual component −(INY − IY) < 0, which
is the loss in allocative efficiency due a movement from h∗N to h
∗. Thus a trade-off exists when
a tax is introduced: appropriation costs decrease but losses associated with an inefficient
allocation of h increase. Obviously, from (24), a tax situation is Kaldor-Hicks superior if the
winning bargaining power of X and Y is sufficiently large, i.e., if µX and µY are close enough
to 1. Note that efficiency gains can also result for µX > 0 if (INX − IX) is large enough.
This, in turn, is more likely for a relatively steep marginal damage curve. Finally, if the
difference INY − IY is relatively small then Kaldor-Hicks improvements exist. This condition
is equivalent to a relatively flat benefit function B(h). This is further discussed within an
example in Subsection 3.1.
From (24) and taking into account that −(INY − IY) + (B¯N − B¯) > 0, we can establish
a sufficient condition for Kaldor-Hicks improvements by comparing ratios of the players’
bargaining powers and their potential rents, as established in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A sufficient condition of Kaldor-Hicks superiority of the tax case is:
µX
(1− µY) >
(INY − IY)
(INX − IX)
(28)
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Proposition 1 shows that efficiency improvements depend on either relatively strong bar-
gaining powers (left hand side) or a steep marginal damage curve relative to the marginal
benefit curve (right hand side). On closer inspection of the role of bargaining powers, re-
flected by the parameters µi for i ∈ {X, Y}, another interesting result is obtained. From (23)
it can be shown that player Y is unambiguously better off in terms of expected payoff when a
tax exists. From (22), if µY = 1 then UX −UNX = 0 and player X is indifferent between both
situations. In summary:
Proposition 2. If µY = 1 then a (Pigouvian) tax in a Coasean environment is Pareto superior to
Coasean bargaining without a tax.
Proposition 2 shows that in a Coasean bargaining game where property rights are appro-
priated via an all-pay auction, the existence of a (Pigouvian) tax can even result in Pareto
superiority.13 In such a case, the cost from appropriation under the standard Coasean setting
is larger or equal to players’ cost under a tax regime. The difference in appropriation costs,
then, more than offsets the inefficiency caused by the over-internalization of harm identified
within the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem.
To illustrate this case, notice that in Figure 2, the term BN(h∗N)−D(h∗N)− (B(h∗)− D(h∗))
corresponds to the area abe f . Notice further that this area represents the difference in inter-
nalization rent, RNY − RY = µY(INY − IY). As for µY = 1, RNY − RY also corresponds to the area
abe f , it follows that UX −UNX = 0, i.e., player X is indifferent between the tax and the ‘no-tax’
case. Thus, it is intuitive that Pareto improvements always exist when µY = 1.
If player Y, the victim, wins and they are able to capture the entire rents (therefore RY =
IY), then Pareto improvements exist. Note that this holds independently of the bargaining
power of player Y when they lose (1− µX), or the bargaining power of player X when they
win (µX). Thus, for µY = 1, the existence of Pareto improvements can be established without
any assumption on the bargaining power of winning player X.
3.1 Linear marginal benefits and damages
To exemplify the general results derived in the previous section and for further analysis, it
is useful to discuss a linear functional specification. Let the marginal benefits and marginal
13We have assumed that the bargaining powers remain identical for the tax and ‘no-tax’ cases. If, however, we
relax this assumption, such that there now exists two levels of bargaining power {µY , µNY }, Pareto improvements
are more likely if µNY is sufficiently larger than µY
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Figure 2: Pareto superiority of the tax case.
damages be given by:
B′(h) = α− β · h− τ, (29)
D′(h) = ω · h, (30)
where α > 0 is the intercept of the marginal benefit function and β,ω > 0 represent the
respective slopes. Note that the Pigouvian tax rate τ cannot plausibly exceed intercept α and
the ‘no-tax’ case can be derived by choosing τ = 0.
Substituting (29) and (30) into (2) and (3) yields:
IX =
ω2(α− τ)2
2β2(β+ω)
, (31)
IY =
(α− τ)2
2(β+ω)
. (32)
Using (31) and (32), we can observe that the welfare effect of a pre-existing tax level τ com-
pared to the ‘no-tax’ case is given by:
∆ =
τ(2α− τ) (ω2µX + β (ω− β+ βµY))
2β2(β+ω)
. (33)
Using (33) it is easily shown that for a maximum to occur (and hence an optimal tax rate
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to exist) we require the following condition to be satisfied:
ω2µX + βω > (1− µY)β2. (34)
Notice that this is always satisfied when ω ≥ β, that is, the slope of the marginal damage func-
tion is equal to or larger than the slope of the marginal benefit function. Hence, the tax case
is always more efficient if the marginal damages to Y are steeper than X’s marginal benefits.
Yet, even if ω < β the condition can still be satisfied as long as µX and µY are relatively large
compared to the absolute values of the slopes. This is consistent with Proposition 1 derived
above. Notice that for the linear case, the right-hand side of condition (28), which relates the
relative bargaining powers to the relative differences in internalization rents, is indeed deter-
mined by the relative slopes. In this case, (INX − IX) is larger for higher values of ω, while
(INY − IY) becomes smaller with lower values of β. The marginal effect of the tax rate on ∆ is
d∆
dτ
=
(α− τ) (ω2µX + β (ω− β(1− µY)))
β2(β+ω)
, (35)
which is non-negative for τ∗ ≤ α if the relative slope ωβ and/or the winners’ bargaining powers
are large enough. Thus for linear marginal curves—with a sufficiently large relative slope ωβ
or bargaining powers—any tax levied will be welfare improving. Note that this includes the
special case of a Pigouvian tax: set at the level of marginal damages in equilibrium.
Optimization of (33) with respect to τ yields additional insights, summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 3. For τ ∈ (0, α] and if (34) holds then ∆ > 0 and the welfare-maximizing per-unit tax
rate is given by τ∗ = α.
For linear marginal curves, the optimal tax rate reduces the level of equilibrium harm
to zero. As a result, Coasean bargaining will no longer be feasible. Hence, in this case,
the regulator favors reducing appropriation costs over losses due to over-internalization of
harm. Simply put, the regulator would rather experience welfare losses from a zero level
of activity rather than experiencing the losses from appropriation activities. Note that this
interior solution only holds if (34) is satisfied. In all other cases, e.g., for a sufficiently steep
marginal benefit curve, the optimum lies in the corner solution τ∗ = 0. Hence, the case for
taxation ultimately depends on the slopes of the damage and benefit functions as well as the
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strength of the winners’ bargaining powers.
3.2 Tax revenue and appropriation
For the analysis above we assumed that tax revenue collected is not recycled or used in any
form, thus our findings are, in fact, quite conservative. If one were to consider the use of
the tax revenue generated, then it is clear that additional benefits can be achieved by, say,
investing in public goods or simply tax restitution.14 It follows that if an all-pay auction
represents the allocation of property right endowments, the existence of a Pigouvian tax may
result in improvements over-and-above those discussed here. To see this, note that the amount
of tax revenue generated is given by τh∗.15 Generally, comparison of the tax revenue versus
the potential loss from player X in (22) reveals the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If τh∗ > (1− µY)(INY − IY) then a tax and lump-sum rebate system levied on player
X is Pareto superior to Coasean bargaining without a tax.
Hence, a policymaker’s choice of tax level is associated with a trade-off. As τ increases
we will also observe h∗ decreasing and (INY − IY) increasing. Whether the tax case is actually
Pareto superior or not will depend on the relative elasticities associated with the marginal
benefit and cost functions. Again, as noted in Proposition 2, the bargaining power of player Y
has a pivotal role in the potential Pareto superiority of a tax system: a large µY can counteract
an increase in (INY − IY) and decrease in h∗.
As we have allowed costly appropriation of property rights under Coasean bargaining, it
is also likely that the rents within a Pigouvian regime may be appropriated. In particular, it is
realistic to consider a scenario where generated tax revenues are obtained by the players (or
a third party) by use of costly appropriation activity. Let us assume that such appropriation
for this tax revenue can also be represented by the all-pay-auction from (1). Note that the
contested prize might be smaller or larger, than the actual tax revenue τh∗. We therefore
specify the prize in this rent-seeking game as λτh∗, with λ > 0. Hence, cases for which λ < 1,
could represent a reduction in the redistributed tax money due to bureaucratic friction or
14Comparing taxation with and without bargaining, Shibata (1972) argues that Pareto improvements do not
exist, as—under an existing tax—the use of bargaining will alter the level of harm and the associated tax revenue,
which reduces the revenue recipient’s utility (a third party). The structure of our model is distinct. We compare
Coasean bargaining with and without a tax. Thus the relative comparative scenarios are those of a bargaining
game where tax revenue is (or is not) generated. Clearly a third party would benefit from any generated tax
revenue.
15The application of a similar refund scheme has been beneficial, for example, see Sterner and Isaksson (2006)
for a successful refunded tax system in Sweden and, for a more general analysis, see Gersbach and Requate (2004).
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earmarking (MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2012). On the other hand it might be conceivable that
the revenue is used to reduce other distortionary taxes. Such cases, with a revenue-recycling
effect, might be represented by λ > 1.16 The players’ expected payoffs from appropriating the
Pigouvian tax revenue are then:
pX(x, y)λτh∗ − x, (36)
pY(x, y)λτh∗ − y. (37)
It is well known that the expected aggregate appropriate costs from this game are λτh∗,
i.e., the rent is fully dissipated. Also, from Hillman and Samet (1987), full dissipation will
occur for any number of players (or third party members) that have identical values for the
tax revenue.17 Thus if third parties—outside of the Coasean bargaining game—attempt to
appropriate the tax revenue, we would continue to see full rent dissipation. Thus we have an
independence result, which shows that the appropriation of Pigouvian tax revenue does not
distort ∆ derived in (24).18 We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If tax revenue is contestable then ∆, the relative Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of a (Pigouvian)
tax, is independent of tax revenue.
A natural question to pose is: how sensitive are our results to the use of an all-pay auction,
which has the property of full rent dissipation? In the appendix, we show the result of a
similar Coasean environment but where the appropriation mechanism is now modeled by
another popular contest mechanism: an imperfectly discriminating ‘Tullock’ contest (Tullock,
1980). The Tullock contest differs from an all-pay auction in that the probability of winning is
now not discrete; instead, the probability is based on a player’s effort relative to total effort.
As a result, equilibrium efforts in a Tullock contest are smaller than that of an all-pay auction.
When our Coasean environment is modeled in such a way, we show that a similar result
occurs. In fact, in this case, if the tax rate is not particularly large, it yields Kaldor-Hicks
superiority even with lower rent dissipation.
16On revenue recycling effects see, for example, Goulder (1995), Parry (1995), and Goulder et al. (1999).
17For asymmetric valuations see Hillman and Riley (1989).
18It is also possible that efforts are expended to distort the level of the tax itself or to delimit the Coasean
bargaining space. If additional efforts were expended to alter the tax rate—Player Y preferring a higher tax rates
and Player X a lower one—then additional costs are added to the Pigouvian regime. Thus the relative efficiency
of a Pigouvian regime will be reduced and it may result in taxation no longer being efficient relative to Coasean
bargaining.
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4 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article is to investigate if Pigouvian taxation levied in a Coasean environ-
ment is superior to a case without taxation. From the early literature on Coasean bargaining,
the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962; Turvey, 1963)
argues that the existence of a Pigouvian tax in an environment where players can bargain will
result in distortions in the level of harm. For example, federal taxation over harm-producing
activities—where the level of harm is negotiated at the local level—is a highly undesirable
scenario.
In this article we take a fresh look at the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem. By re-
laxing the assumption on how property rights are allocated in society we show that efficiency
improvements may exist if a Pigouvian tax is levied. We allow players to expend costly ef-
fort in order to appropriate property rights. This can, for example, be interpreted as violent
conflict, litigation, as well as lobbying activities. Property rights can be de jure non-existent or
costly to enforce/define. By providing a realistic environment within which property rights
are allocated we show the Pigouvian tax reduces the gains from Coasean exchange. As a
result, this may reduce equilibrium appropriation effort more than the loss from allocative
inefficiency. Our results continue to hold when rent seeking over the tax revenue is taken into
account.
A strong case in favor of pre-existing green taxes can be established within the original ap-
plication of the Coase Theorem; namely, environmental liability and litigation. Within Coase
(1960), property rights are attributed via the establishment of liability through a court order.
The actual bargaining process can then be interpreted as some sort of settlement between
plaintiff and defendant. Note, however, that due to the assumption of zero transaction costs,
costs of litigation are generally not considered in the original formulation of the Coase Theo-
rem. Within models in the field of Law and Economics, these costs are generally derived by
modeling the lawsuit as a contest. When integrating the cost of litigation into the Coasean
framework, several established efficiency implications of the Coase Theorem tend to change
(Robson and Skaperdas, 2008; MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013a,b). As shown above, this also
holds true for the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey result. Hence, when it comes to environmen-
tal liability and litigation, it is quite likely that a pre-existing tax is efficiency enhancing, as
it ‘dampens’ the controversy and hence overall spending in litigation. An example for such
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a situation might be the consent decree between the US EPA and several diesel engine man-
ufacturers on emission restrictions, which resulted after a settlement in the ’Not-To-Exceed
standard’ for newly introduced Diesel engines. As laid out in Morriss et al. (2005, 2009), the
cost for additional emission reductions imposed on the manufacturers (and hence the matter
of controversy) was significant. Yet, it can be argued that these costs would have been higher
if pre-existing fuel taxes and other incentive mechanisms19 had not put additional pressure
on emissions per mile driven.20
It is to be noted that fully internalizing taxes are mainly a theoretical construct as, in
reality, green taxes tend to be too low to yield the first-best level of externality (e.g., Ciocirlan
and Yandle, 2003).21 In our model, we do not assume the tax level to be necessarily fully
internalizing. Indeed, as shown in our linear specification, if the slope of the marginal damage
function is equal to or larger than the slope of the marginal benefit function then any level of
tax will be efficiency improving.
Our article thus provides a formal argument in favor of taxation when there is a potential
for negotiation in the level of harm. Our analysis can provide insights to the separation
of regulatory responsibilities, such as in environmental federalism as well as environmental
liability and litigation issues.
19In 1991 an emissions trading system for NOx emissions of Diesel engines was introduced (Morriss et al., 2009).
20Another example for internalization of external cost via a lawsuit with settlement and pre-existing taxes is the
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, see Sloan and Trogdon (2004), Sung et al. (2005), and Morriss et al. (2009).
21Interestingly, Pigou himself was aware of the political economy issues relating to taxes, as he stated: "we
cannot expect that any public authority will attain, or will even wholeheartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities
are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by private interest. A loud-voice part
of their constituents, if organized for votes, may easily outweigh the whole ” (Pigou, 1932, p. 332).
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Appendix: Tullock contest
The Tullock contest success function is given by pX(x, y) where
pX(x, y) =

x
x+y if max{x, y} > 0,
1
2 otherwise,
(A.1)
and pY(x, y) = 1− pX(x, y). In this ‘Tullock’ contest, the player with the highest effort now
has a probabilistic chance of obtaining the property rights. It can be shown that the difference
in players’ expected payoff when a tax is introduced is as follows:
∆X = UX −UNX =
1
4
(
(1− µX)
(
B¯− B¯N
)
+ µX
(
D¯− D¯N
)
+ (µX − 3µY + 3)K
)
, (A.2)
∆Y = UY −UNY =
1
4
(
3
(
(1− µX)
(
B¯N − B¯
)
+ µX
(
D¯N − D¯
))
− (3µX − µY − 3)K
)
, (A.3)
where K = B(h∗)− BN(h∗N)−D(h∗) + D(h∗N) < 0. Summation of (A.2) and (A.3) shows that a
situation with a pre-existing Pigouvian tax in a Coasean bargaining game can be Kaldor-Hicks
superior to a case without a tax, as
∆X + ∆Y =
1
2
(
(1− µX)
(
B¯N − B¯
)
+ µX
(
D¯N − D¯
)
+ (3− µX − µY)K
)
. (A.4)
Note that this term is positive, indicating Kaldor-Hicks improvements, if K is small enough,
which holds for a sufficiently low τ.
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